



European Security - Quo Vadis?

Captain Rory Finnegan of the Infantry Training School in the Curragh takes a look at the status of European Security and Defence and analyses where the new challenges will come from.

Introduction

The end of the Cold War has posed tremendous challenges to Europe. The break up of the Soviet Union and the unification of Germany has formulated a whole new strategic landscape. The foreign and defence policies of the previous forty years no longer seemed to apply. This transformation has resulted in the changing nature of security and as a consequence the changing nature of security co-operation and institutions. In a European context institutions do indeed matter. They have arguably been the most important elements explaining co-operation in Western Europe since 1945.

The two dominant organisations that have looked down upon the European stage during this period have been NATO in terms of defence issues and the EEC, later the EU in terms of economic power. The end of the bi-polar period made it inevitable that the European Union (EU) should seek to strengthen itself, so as to be able to meet the challenges of a rapidly transforming Europe. Academics, military analysts as well as politicians began to put more emphasis on the development of a common European Foreign & Security policy as well as common defence capabilities.

It was obvious even then that the former Soviet Union could no longer pose the old conventional military threat to Western Europe, though there was a fear that Russia could still be a potential destabilising factor in the region. With her vast size, population and nuclear arsenal, she was still regarded as a "great power," that could cause potential problems in terms of European security.

With the demise of the Warsaw Pact many scholars sought to try and analyse possible future threats to Europe. As outlined, the possible return of Russia to a more authoritarian regime was seen as one possibility. Instability in central and Eastern Europe, which geopolitically had always been regarded as a form of "crush zone," located as it was between the former Soviet Union and Western Europe, was seen as another potential destabilising factor. But now previous issues not formerly regarded as constituting security threats were seen in a much more wide ranging and holistic sense. These were what became known as the "Threats of the 21st Century," AIDS, drugs, pollution and environmental issues. These are sometimes referred to as "Soft Security" issues as compared to the "Hard Security", purely military issues that dominated the Cold War. This should in no way detract from the seriousness that such issues pose to the security of the global system. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), particularly in the Third World, was also seen, and is still seen, as a major developing threat.

The New Structure

There were at least three possible models that were seen as creating possible paradigms to deal with the new security environment. First was the preservation of the bi-polar system that had defined relationships during the Cold War period. This was almost a non starter as the world had become multi-polar with the end of the Cold War. The second model implied the creation of a new security regime in Europe based on a series of com-

monly agreed, norms, principles and decision making procedures. The third proposed an intensive programme of pan-European integration in all possible fields.

Parallel to this debate many now looked at what role NATO would adopt within this new security architecture. Here Europeans themselves were split into two different camps. The Atlanticist group were intimately concerned with the issue of US engagement and the fear of losing it. The Europeanist group conversely wished to plough a more independent furrow for Europe in the field of foreign policy and security. They were themselves further divided, on the one hand the minimalist view that NATO should stick to its original *raison d'être*, the defence of Europe from a potential large scale conventional invasion by Russia. Parallel to this the minimalists also contended that the European Community should evolve into a fuller political union with an independent defence structure. The maximalist view within the Europeanist camp held that NATO should undertake new, mainly non-military types of challenges.

From an American point of view, NATO was regarded as the most essential forum of US - European co-operation and as such the most important means of keeping the US engaged in Europe. Madeline Albright, the US Secretary of State, spoke of the three 'Ds' in relation to any possible developments in European security. Any that might take place should not involve a decoupling from NATO, no duplication of the tasks already undertaken by NATO and no discrimination against NATO. The emergence and develop-

ment of the European Security and Defence Policy does not put the US establishment at ease even though there are certain welcome elements in it for Washington.

NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson following Madeline Albright's famous three 'D's', has invented his less negative "three I's" on ESDP. Which referred to the indivisibility of the transatlantic link, the improvement of European capabilities and the inclusiveness of all Allies in Europe's Defence policy.

parts of the world but mainly the periphery of Europe. One of the preconditions for this was that organisations such as NATO, the EU, WEU and OSCE must co-operate and compliment each other rather than compete. These organisations are often referred to as constituting the "Alphabet Soup" of European security.

NATO itself began to proactively address the new security environment. The London Declaration of 1990 stated that "the Atlantic Community must reach out to the

Defence Ministries. In 1997 an enhanced PfP programme was introduced which had a more operationally focused role. Politically on the European stage events began to move along. Foreign and security policy integration within the EEC/EU had always been the most difficult question. Indeed it was this debate that lay at the heart of the divide between Federalists and Intergovernmentalists. Under these circumstances, the evolution of what we call a Common Foreign & Security Policy (CFSP)



The fall of the Berlin Wall, German reunification, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the flowering of democracy in former Communist central Europe. These events caused a seismic, paradigm shift in security perceptions at the end of the Cold War.

Early Developments

It was back in Dec 1991 when the Maastricht Treaty was signed in Europe that a mood of euphoria swept the continent. This was the "annus mirabilis" of 1989/90 that had seen a stunning range of developments that nobody could have possibly foreseen or predicted. The fall of the Berlin Wall, German reunification, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the flowering of democracy in former Communist central Europe. These events caused a seismic, paradigm shift in security perceptions at the end of the Cold War. Now the priority of collective security policy had gradually shifted from the objective of self defence, which used to be the sole NATO mandate during the Cold War era, to the intention to 'export' stability to other

countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship." At Rome the following year NATO set itself the task of acting as "one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe." The idea was mooted of a framework of interlocking institutions, which would be mutually reinforcing, based on the premise that the challenges faced by the "New Europe," could not be addressed by one institution alone. NATO sought to copperfasten this with a new dimension to its relationship and these new 'partner' countries when Partnership for Peace (PfP) was launched by the Clinton administration in 1994. PfP ostensibly offered a wide range of activities including reforms of militaries and

or rather what has now become known since the Cologne summit of 1999 as a Common European Security & Defence Policy (CESDP), also sometimes referred to as the European Security & Defence Dimension (ESDD). A summit in Helsinki later that year defined new EU structures to undertake the crisis-management role and proposed an EU Rapid Reaction Force that would be able to deploy up to 60,000 troops within 60 days and sustain them on the ground for at least a year. This has been slow and protracted within the European community compared to economic integration. The latter is sometimes referred to as the first pillar of European integration while the debate on Defence and security has become known as the second pillar.

The Second Pillar

A brief overview of the evolution and debate in relation to the second pillar might be helpful. An early attempt was the creation of the European Defence Community (EDC), in early 1950's. Its dynamic was the notion of multi-dimensional European integration as the strongest assurance against internal as well as external warfare. This was established in a Treaty signed without Britain in 1952, but in 1954 the French National Assembly declined to ratify the Treaty. Some hurried diplomacy, this time with a strong British input produced the Modified Brussels Treaty of 23 October 1953 which created the institution of the Western European Union (WEU). With European defence during the Cold War now under the umbrella of NATO the issue of an independent European Defence identity was now no longer to the fore and the WEU itself by the 1970's had effectively become mothballed in an almost dormant like slumber. It did however serve as an ambiguous bridge between the EU which represented the economic powerhouse of Europe and NATO the powerhouse in terms of defence issues.

In 1970, as a result of the Luxembourg Report which explored "informal intergovernmental framework outside the EEC treaties, the concept of European Political Co-operation (EPC) came into being. Heads of government wanted to develop Community's international image equal to its growing economic importance. They wanted "Europe to speak with one voice." The Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 reinforced the predominantly intergovernmentalist approach to Foreign policy as part of European political co-operation (EPC). Thus while EPC evolved as a useful forum for foreign policy discussions among EEC members, security policy *per se* remained firmly in the hands of intergovernmentalists. But it was the very unpredictable security environment at end of the Cold War that began inexorably to press EEC member states towards a more effective co-operation in the sphere of security.

This desire to play a greater role was further stimulated by the Gulf War of 1991. The United States was the dominant partner in the coalition against Iraq. Again these unsolved questions largely contributed to the failure of the EEC attempted mediation in the Balkan conflict as the horrors of the war in Bosnia unfolded. During the Yugoslav war the internal debate over sovereignty and defence paralysed the EEC. Europe tried to remain impartial and at the same time inter-

vened in the conflict through economic sanctions. This led to confusion and as one critic remarked "the European Community's performance in Yugoslavia generated more heat than light." The shock of such violence so close to the EEC's borders prompted some politicians to declare, foolishly that the hour of Europe had arrived. The possibility of using military force to implement a negotiated cease-fire, through the WEU was mooted, but British objected as they felt that such a long term commitment could not be sustained. The other significant problem was that the WEU having been awoken from its Rip Van Winkle slumber had not only no military forces at its disposal but no real planning or co-ordination capability. It had become a useful forum for co-ordination of national positions and little more. The crisis in the Balkans highlighted the way different political, historical and economic interests among EU member-states hindered the formation of coherent EU positions and strategies in moments of crisis

The Road from Maastricht to Amsterdam

However the Balkan debacle was a turning point on the road to a single Foreign and Security policy. The Maastricht Treaty which entered into force in 1993 had as one of its mainstays the Foreign & Security Policy (CFSP). The creation of the CFSP represented in a very real and tangible way that economic well being and military security are interdependent. In essence the twelve at the time had reached the stage where a commitment to try and co-ordinate foreign policies ought to be replaced by a commitment to succeed. While the CFSP embodied the potential for European integration, on the other hand bitter disagreements and unanswered questions remained unresolved. These included the very purpose of the security arrangement, future relations between the EEC and NATO, funding, and the very issue of sovereignty itself. But as a consequence of the Maastricht Treaty the European Union (EU) came into being and the EEC was consigned to the pages of history. However for all the disagreements Maastricht did contain advances in the foreign policy field. It outlined general objectives and 'reinforced' states commitment to a "systematic co-operation" on international issues. It weakened the restraint of the 1986 Single European Act security discussions. It further committed member states to work towards a common defence policy. In essence the CFSP


aimed at turning the foreign policy co-operation within the Union into a more formal, disciplined and effective process. CFSP included all questions related to the security of the Union including the possible eventual formation of a common defence policy. Most significantly by late 1998 attitudes began to change towards European defence, most notably in the UK and France.

In December of that year after the historic St. Malo declaration, both nations agreed that the EU had to be in a position to play a full role on international stage, and the two nations endorsed the progressive framing of a common defence policy within the framework of the CFSP. Both the Germans and the Italians lent their support later in the year. Thus the main European military players were aboard. For the British, such a fundamental shift cannot be overestimated or underplayed. It was a clear shift from the Atlanticist stance. St. Malo had in effect slaughtered a "sacred cow." The declaration identified the EU as the organisation which should be in charge of the Defence of Europe.

The Amsterdam Treaty which entered into force in 1999 was to heal the shortcomings of Maastricht. It sought to amend the provisions of the CFSP with a view to improving its coherence, credibility and effectiveness. Decision making procedures were significantly improved. While unanimity was continued to be the rule for all fundamental policy decisions, the risk of deadlock was reduced by allowing for a "constructive abstention." Additionally the Union was vested with the capacity to negotiate and conclude international agreements to implement its common foreign and security policy. But importantly this 'supranational' institutional arrangement does not apply to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the "Second Pillar." Qualified majority voting has made very little headway in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and none at all regarding military policy, which remains the strict preserve of intergovernmentalism.

The European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF)

At the Helsinki summit in December 1999 the decision was taken to establish a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), to undertake the full range of so-called Petersburg Tasks. In effect a force of 60,000 personnel, capable of being deployed for a year at sixty days notice. The force was to be ready for possible operational deployment by



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the so-called headline goal date of 2003 as outlined at Helsinki. The Rapid Reaction Force has therefore been inspired by a perceived common interest in a stable border region for a greatly enlarged EU, and a desire to help those states develop and avoid political and natural disasters. Although the EU and NATO are moving closer, the Rapid Reaction Force has a very different purpose from the Western Alliance. Unlike NATO, the EU force does not involve a mutual defence pact, and participation in each operation is voluntary. Decisions to use the military instrument of the ERRF are exclusively in the hands of national government ministers who can only act by unanimity. Thus any deployment of the ERRF is for decision on a case by case basis and will be subject to the right of veto by any member state. In effect if so much as one state says no, then quite simply the force cannot be deployed.

Defence Spending

Another issue for European security that has been brought sharply into focus is some ten years after the collapse of Communism promised a "peace dividend" in the form of lower defence spending, Europeans are waking up to the realisation that such a force does not come cheaply. Military chiefs believe right across Europe that the

Headline Goals cannot be met without spending more. Necessary reforms in various militaries, especially the German Bundeswehr, are behind schedule.

Looming over all of this is the colossal military might of the United States of America. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that in 2003 the US military budget will be an almost incomprehensible \$379 billion. To put this in context, it dwarfs the combined spending of the next fourteen spenders, including Japan, all of Western Europe, Russia and China. Put another way, 40% of worldwide defence spending is encompassed by the US military budget. A crucial issue is how relations between the EU political and military structures of the ERRF will relate to NATO. Right across Europe the very debate to resolve what is the relationship between security and defence has still not gone away. Military and security specialists increasingly make the distinction between wars of choice and wars of obligation. We have seen how, post Cold War, the very nature of security has changed profoundly in Europe. It was extended to encompass a pan-European security community, a continental zone of peace, where the nations of Europe would have a common interest in a stable border region for an enlarged EU. But other scenar-

ios that have been mooted whereby the ERRF might be committed have included Mozambique and East Timor, hardly the periphery of Europe? Until that has been resolved, can a defined strategic vision be elucidated for the ERRF? Such a strategic vision would need to encompass a clear mission analysis for the wide range of potential operational deployments under the aegis of the Petersberg Tasks¹. As outlined these tasks cover a broad agenda but does not involve classical collective territorial defence based on mutual assistance guarantees. The French would like the military planning process to be autonomous and distinct from NATO, but most other members argue that unnecessary duplication should be avoided at all costs.

The Aftermath of 11th September

The events of September 11th have now more sharply focused the debate as to how European security will evolve and develop. Many Europeans, while utterly appalled at the attack on the Twin Towers, were prepared to lend conditional support to the American declared war on terrorism. While the war in Afghanistan is still ongoing the US is now seeking to broaden military action, principally against Saddam Hussein's

Iraq. George Bush in his "Axis of Evil" speech, seemed to be preparing both American and European public opinion for a potential military strike against Iraq.

Europe remains deeply divided over such an expansion in the war against terrorism. Interestingly as a result of the September 11th attack, Britain under Tony Blair will have no great difficulty in choosing between its Atlanticist and European instincts. Many now believe that Mr. Blair now seeks to differentiate himself from Europe. September 11th reinforced this view after events in Kosovo, where Blair felt that Europe had only become good at 'sabre rattling.' Meanwhile events in the Middle East with the ongoing savagery of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have both the capacity to rupture EU-US relations and develop the European security regime.

Arab regimes have made it clear to the US that there will be no support in any action against Iraq in light of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A mood seems to be developing in European capitals that Europe must be more proactive in the current Middle East crisis than it was in the Balkan's war of a decade ago.

Meanwhile Russia sees the events of September 11th as a vindication of her long

held view that international terrorism motivated by Islamic extremism is a major threat to international security. The development of closer ties with Europe, particularly in the security sphere has been a long standing Russian aim. The Russians see such a developing relationship not only in security but in economic issues as a means of cementing their relationship with a Europe increasingly independent of the USA. This would fulfill a long standing Russian strategic vision of the emergence of a less Atlanticist Europe, with a Russia more closely tied to NATO, along with the probable development of EU military structures.

Conclusion

The Cold War bargain struck between a recovering Europe and a hegemonic America is fast wearing thin. The relationship of the US and the European Union is one of the single most important chapters in international affairs for the coming decade. Europe and the US are certainly going through a post Cold War redefinition as is Europe's relationship with the Russian Federation. Europe having so successfully achieved so much in economic and political terms is now seeking to redefine its role on the world stage where it can have an independent and

major voice alongside a coherent security policy. Therefore a profound process of equalisation is under way between Europe and the United States spanning economic, foreign policy, political and security issues. It concerns different approaches to the exercise of global power and influence. This is the geopolitical conundrum at the heart of this transition. The coin has been tossed but still hangs in the air.

Captain Rory Finegan BA MA MSc is stationed in The Infantry School where he instructs on Security Studies in all schools of the Military College. He also lectures part-time on National Security & International Order at DCU as part of their MA in International Relations programme.

1 The so-called Petersburg Tasks, defined in the Treaty of Amsterdam as "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking." Named after the German official government guest house, where in June 1992 the WEU was tasked in strengthening of its operational role in several ways and widened its function for the employment of forces. The tasks do not include core commitment of a classical military alliance. There is no provision for a mutual security guarantee.



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NATIONAL EXECUTIVE SEMINAR



Back row, left to right: Ronan O'Boyle, Sharon McManus, Adrian Ryan, Séan White, John Hamill, Owen Ross, Gerry O'Leary, Mick Geraghty.
Front row, left to right: John O'Keefe, Paul Allen, Brian O'Keefe, Séan O'Shea.


The RACO National Executive Seminar took place in Galway on the 17th and 18th April 2002. The new National Executive participated in the two-day seminar which included a briefing from the professional staff on all current association issues such as RACO finances, pay, pensions, allowances, and medical, as well as bullying and harassment.

During the colloquium, the new executive formulated their general policies for the next

two years, which included a decision to investigate possible entry into the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) and the European military union (EUROMIL). The decision was also made to publish a RACO Code of Practice on Bullying, Discrimination, Harassment and Sexual Harassment.

It was also decided to secure improvements in pensions, guided by the seven motions on pensions arising from ADC's.

This executive consists of the chairpersons of the eight regional committees, including the new USAC committee which represents full-time 3rd level students and Lt. Col. Paul Allen, President; Col. Brian O'Keefe, General Secretary; Col. Adrian Ryan, Deputy General Secretary and Capt. Mick Geraghty, Research Officer.




John Hamill

Rank: Commandant
Unit: Combat Support Section DFHQ
Marital Status: Married
Age: 46
Work No.: 2050

John's goals as chairperson are to elicit the views of the members in DFHQ and to submit these to the National Executive and to effectively communicate policy to our members. His vision for the future of RACO is for the Association to continue serving the officer body in the same effective professional way that it has up to now.

John is an Artillery Corps Officer with approximately 30 years service in the Western Brigade, The Military College and Defence Forces Headquarters. He has seven overseas tours of peacekeeping duties. He has held both command as well as staff appointments at home and abroad, and also held instructional appointments in the Artillery School and Command and Staff School.

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Sean O'Shea


Rank: Commandant
 Unit: Logistics
 Base: Curragh
 Marital Status: Married
 Age: 38
 Work No. 5452

Sean's goals as Chairperson are to represent the views of all rank of officers within the DFTC and ensure that RACO continues to be a vibrant association, particularly in the DFTC. He aspires to ensure that RACO continues to be a professional representative Association in order to make certain that Defence Force officers have a professional, challenging and rewarding career. Sean is an officer of the Ordnance Corps with over 21 years service in the Western Brigade and the Curragh. He has a BSc in Chemistry and has served overseas in Lebanon.

Gerard O'Leary

Rank: Commandant
 Unit: Headquarters, 1 Southern Brigade
 Marital Status: Married
 Age: 43
 Work No.: 4104

Gerry aims to develop greater participation at a strategic level between RACO and the official side and to enhance partnership structures at national and regional levels. This is Gerry's first time as an elected representative. He has over 25 years military experience ranging from service in Donegal, Galway, Curragh and Cork as well as over two years service in the Middle East.



Owen Ross

Rank: Captain
 Unit: 4th Cavalry Squadron
 Marital Status: Single
 Age: 29
 Work No.: 1954

Owen wants to ensure minority groups are fully and fairly represented as well as to increase the interest and involvement of officers in the Western Brigade in RACO. Owens' ambition for RACO is to ensure an all-encompassing association that continues to improve the pay and conditions of service of officers. Owen was commissioned in 1993 and has a BComm in Human Resource Management and a M.A. in Communication and Cultural Studies. He has served in both Athlone and Longford.



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Sean White

Rank: Captain
 Unit: 2nd Field Communications and Information Systems Company
 Marital Status: Married
 Age: 36
 Work No.: 6281

Sean has over 15 years service as an officer and graduated from UCG with a BSc. He also has an Hdip in IT, and has served in the Curragh, Baldonnel and Dublin as well as overseas service in Lebanon and Somalia. Sean is keen to ensure that RACO is seen as a positive influence on all aspects of an officer's service within the Brigade. He aims to maintain RACO as a modern and vibrant association that seeks to enhance the service of the professional military officer.

John O'Keeffe

Rank: Commandant
 Unit: No. 3 Support Wing (Heli)
 Marital Status: Married
 Age: 31
 Work No.: 7588

John has 14 years military experience and he received his flying wings in 1991. He is the Chief Helicopter Instructor in the Air Corps. John vows to continue to highlight the concerns of Air Corps members particularly in the area of flight safety, and to strive to remove the significant distractions that prevent officers from managing the flying operation. John views RACO as a highly competent professional organisation, and he intends to encourage Air Corps officers to be more involved in issues ranging from benchmarking to bullying and sexual harassment.



Ronan O'Boyle

Rank: Lieutenant (NS)
 Unit: Naval Service
 Marital Status: Married
 Age: 30
 Work No.: 4994

Among Ronan's goals as chairman is to coordinate an efficient and effective team on the Naval Service committee in order to ensure timely representation for all RACO members in the Naval Service. Ronan would also like to pursue increased affiliation with other representative associations such as ICTU. Ronan has eleven years experience and has served on LE Deirdre, LE Roisin and LE Orla as well as attending an international naval course with the Royal Navy. Ronan is completing a BSc in IT at present.





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Sharon McManus


Rank: Lieutenant
 Unit: USAC
 Marital Status: Single
 Age: 23
 Work No.: 1765

Sharon is the first Chairperson of the newly formed USAC. This committee was established principally in light of the fact that one in 12 officers are stationed in USAC at any particular time and do not have ready access to their barrack representatives. Sharon intends to increase awareness among the officers in USAC as to the functions, services and benefits of RACO. She is aware of the need to facilitate the passage of information to and from USAC members to the National Executive as well as to provide a platform for junior officers to air their views opinions. She has been a member of the Defence Forces for seven years and is in her 3rd year of the Civil Engineering Degree programme.



*Pictured far left: Lt Col. Paul Allen,
 President of RACO.*

*Pictured left: Comdt. Brian O'Keefe, General
 Secretary of RACO.*



*Pictured far left: Comdt. Adrian Ryan,
 Deputy General Secretary of RACO.*

*Pictured left: Capt. Mick Geraghty, Research
 Officer, RACO.*

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The following claims are currently under negotiation at Conciliation Council

- Claim for an increase in overseas telephone allowance
- Claim for the payment of travel allowances for officers attending career courses
- Claim for the payment of change of station allowances to an officer on attachment
- Claim for the payment of FMD allowance
- Claim - starting pay on promotion to the rank of Comdt (Army Line)
- Claim - Travel Pass Scheme
- Claim for Reimbursement of Membership Fees - Irish Nautical Institute
- Claim that substitution allowance should increase incrementally for officers who serve in 'acting up appointments' for periods in excess of one year
- Claim - Asia Deployment LE Niamh
- Claim for an increase in leave for Officers who have 20 or more year's commissioned service
- Claim for continuation of medical services on retirement
- Claim in respect of carry over leave
- Claim for an increase in PDA - weekend & holiday rates

must all strive to ensure our personnel operate in an environment which has a zero tolerance of any level of harassment, bullying or discrimination.

RACO is also confident that personnel systems already in place within the Defence Forces, coupled with the recommendations accompanying the report, can form the basis of the best possible solution to these important personnel issues now raised. The ongoing review of Grievance Procedures and instructions on Interpersonal Relationships, the introduction of an Ombudsman, the family-friendly policies, the Personnel Support Services - and other significant human resources' initiatives can all contribute to a better and more supportive working environment. The positive and sensible response of Defence Forces management to this report is welcomed and required. The Irish Defence Forces now operate in several countries around the world and contribute to the overall positive image of Ireland on a daily basis. We should not be satisfied with standards which pertain elsewhere on personnel issues - we must develop systems and responses which act as a model for the Defence Forces and like organisations around the world - and this we believe is entirely possible. The Independent Monitoring Group (IMG) has already been established and consists of the following members: Dr. Eileen Doyle, Chairperson; Brian O'Keefe, RACO; Gerry Rooney, PDFORRA; Major General Jim Sreenan Deputy Chief of Staff (Support); Michael Howard, Assistant Secretary General, Department of Defence.

The terms of reference of the IMG are:

1. To agree a draft implementation plan for the Minister's approval
2. To co-ordinate and manage the overall implementation process
3. To provide a forum for the discussion and agreement of issues which arise in the course of the implementation.

The group will agree to proceed at all times by consensus. The group will be kept fully informed of specific measures being undertaken by the Defence Forces or either Association in connection with the implementation of the report and will seek to co-ordinate such undertakings. The group may delegate the drafting of specific elements of the plan.

A copy of the full report can be found on www.gov.ie/defence/ExternalAdvisoryCommitteeReport.pdf

The Doyle Report

RACO has welcomed the Doyle Report on 'Harassment, Workplace Bullying, Discrimination and Sexual Harassment in the Defence Forces'. The report raises many serious issues, which require an immediate proactive approach - and the Association welcomes the response from Defence Forces management, which outlines a clearly-defined policy and the motivation to tackle the issues raised. It is also of interest to note in the report the comment to the effect that Defence Forces

personnel experience a "high level of satisfaction with various features of their lives in the military... regarding colleagues, conditions of work and those with whom they worked. This report follows the analysis of a detailed questionnaire issued to a substantial cross section of Defence Forces' membership. This constitutes a comprehensive response from membership on crucially important issues in regard to the conduct, management and support available to personnel. We fully accept this report and welcome it - and firmly hold the view that with the appropriate responses we can create a better and more effective Defence Force."

RACO also recognises that, as outlined in the 'Report of the Task Force on the Prevention of Bullying in the Workplace' organisational change can contribute to bullying and other behavioural issues. Three of the four factors outlined in the Task Force report that contribute to bullying are particularly relevant to the Defence Forces at this time. They are as follows:

- New management/management turnover
- Reorganisation,
- Introduction of new technology

EU research on sexual harassment and statistics from research on Defence Forces in both Australia and the US help put the present findings in context. Whereas this report by Dr. Eileen Doyle shows that the findings for Defence Forces are not unique or as excessive as the studies referred to above we



Eileen Doyle, author of the report.

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Dress Code

In a demanding job with varied responsibilities, the need for rapid response to work wear demands is important for getting the job done. You need the right equipment, the right tools, and the right clothing to be able to meet the day-to-day challenges of the Defence Forces. As a market leader in the career wear industry, Acorn Fashions continue to meet this challenge by combining traditional skills with technological advances and have forged a reputation as a company that can be relied upon.

Acorn understands that different industries, and even organisations within the same industry have unique design, fabric and supply requirements. Comfort and practicality are always designed into each garment. And with a wider choice of stock supported uniforms available, the collection offers true diversity and reliability. Acorn strongly believes that the professional at work expects and deserves a lot more from what they wear.

Commercial Report.



One per cent lump sum - 1st April 2002

Officers, like all public and civil servants, were paid a 1% lump sum as part of the national wage agreement, the PPF. The 1% is calculated of each person's basic annual salary including allowances in the nature of pay (but not other allowances such as SDA etc.) on 1st April 2002. Officers on a career break/leave of absence are not entitled to the lump sum but those on maternity or sick leave are.

Civil Service Travel Pass Scheme

This scheme, published by the Department of Finance last autumn, was introduced across the civil service on 1st January last. The scheme permits an employer to purchase a bus or rail commuter ticket for their staff tax-free. When raised by RACO last year the Department of Defence contended that the scheme did not apply to the Defence Forces. RACO lodged a formal claim for the applicability of this scheme to officers of the Defence Forces and it transpires that it did apply to the Defence Forces from its inception. However, having conceded that members of the Defence Forces may avail of this scheme, the department have expressed reservations about their ability to administer this scheme and have proposed that the scheme be deferred until January 2003. Quite clearly the department's contended inability to administer this scheme will cost Defence Forces bus and rail commuters a lot of money. RACO have insisted that this scheme be introduced immediately and have raised this issue at DFHQ Forum in order to encourage the military authorities to expedite the current problems.

Defence Forces HQ Forum

The following items were discussed at the recent meeting:

- Undertakings, under the following areas:
 - USAC & Pilot Undertakings
 - Refund of Fees Scheme
 - Courses of Fundamental necessity to the Defence Forces
 - Military Courses outside Defence Force establishments.
- Instructors Selection Criteria (Foreign International UN Courses)
- Pay (Individual Case)
- Review of the Rates of Commuted Car Allowances
- Review of Overseas Selection Criteria
- Military Administrative Procedures
- Officers Serving Overseas
- Criteria governing the selection of officers for overseas courses
- VHI Global Cover - Overseas Accompanied Missions-Policy Statement for Naval Officers who qualify for four-year honours BSc degree
- Border Rotation Policy for Junior Officers
- Officer Accommodation Policy
- Public Service Travel Pass Scheme.
- DF Dental Service
- FCA Reorganisation
- Subsistence Payments to Yos
- Provision of Annual Confidential Reports for the ADC to the President and the Taoiseach.

Family-friendly policies

Family-friendly policies were introduced as part of the current national wage agreement, the PPF. One of those policies, the civil service term-time working scheme, was introduced on a pilot basis in some departments last summer. The scheme allows an employee to take two months unpaid leave during the summer school recess but to have the balance of the annual salary paid in 12 equal amounts. RACO formally claimed the applicability of this aspect of the PPF due to the fact that negotiations on the introduction of the term-time scheme for officers were progressing at an unsatisfactory rate. These human resource and management practices as directed by the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness are applicable to the rest of the civil service. The department, in a letter to RACO have now stated that they are denying the term-time scheme to RACO members. They stated that the military authorities have examined the feasibility of implementing the scheme and they concluded that the introduction of such a scheme would pose considerable problems. The official side have not divulged the research that supports this personnel policy.

Pte Peadar Ó Flatharta

Glacann Uachtarán RACO agus an Coiste Gnóthaí Náisiúnta comhbhrón ó chroí le muintir Pheadair Ó Flatharta, lena chomhleacaithe agus lena chairde uilig de bharr a bhás tragóideach agus é faoi sheirbhís síochánta ar son na Náisiúin Aontaithe le ghairid.

Ar Dheis Dé go raibh a anam dhílis.