

# Central Command

**A**t the end of March, Commandant Michael Geraghty interviewed the recently appointed Director General of the EU Military Staff, Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) David Leakey, at its headquarters in the Cortenbergh Building in Brussels and discussed a wide range of European defence and military issues.

**The EU has had a number of successful involvements in Aceh, the Balkans and Darfur. As a former commander of the European Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in 2004-2005 do you envisage similar future roles for a EUFOR?**

European Security & Defence Policy (ESDP) is about bringing stability not only through security measures - whether it's military peacekeeping or security sector review or disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration into society on the military side, or through other instruments of civilian style activity such as the rule of law, justice, police, financial and political institution building, development and support of the economy, creation of a civic society and so on. What we saw in the ESDP deployments of the EU Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU Police Mission (EUPM) and EU Special Representative (EUSR) there was really the first go at such an operation on such a grand scale.

Was it good? No, it was not very good but nor was it very bad; the main reason why it was not very good was because all the distinct entities went there at different times and for different purposes; for example the EU Police Mission (EUPM) went in over 18 months before EUFOR military force. Secondly, the overall mission had a mandate which was constructed for the circumstances at that time and mission planners did not envisage a military force being introduced there, and so its mandate really needed adjustment to accommodate a working relationship with the other EU agencies.



*Lt General David Leakey addressing a EUFOR briefing in 2004.*

Thirdly by way of example, when EUFOR arrived the EU Special Representative was already well established there. As a result, we were all out of step; that was an accident of history and chronology and not of design. Being out of step in fact had its positives, because it meant that systemic failings were diagnosed and within a short time the EUPM mandate was adjusted, the terms of reference of the EU Special Representative were altered; all with the aim of achieving this so-called 'comprehensive approach' whereby all the civilian and military actors

work coherently together.

Nevertheless there were some cultural obstacles: for example the police instinctively do not like the engagement or involvement of the military in policing matters, partly because they are the policing experts, but mostly because in our own countries the military are kept out of policing matters. But where we find ourselves in an extraordinary situation with extraordinary circumstance you need to take extraordinary measures and so EUPM and EUFOR took a short while before we got our act together.

So, from that perspective, EUFOR was very good because it taught us some vital lessons for the future.

### **How effective and adaptable were military personnel for this type of role? Were the troops up to the job?**

The answer is of course yes and no. The principal purpose for which the military were in Bosnia and in almost all situations where they are going to be present and deployed is to maintain a safe and secure environment. This means you have to be prepared to take on a fight and you have to be prepared to take casualties if the situation gets really bad; that's at one end of the spectrum of what the military really do in a peacekeeping or peace enforcement situation. In Bosnia it was more a mission to deter a resumption of hostilities; but in fact we were even a little bit more advanced than that insofar that our presence also provided reassurance to the community.

For the military to undertake those roles in a place like Bosnia, or anywhere else, you need numbers and you need credibility. Did I have confidence in the force that I had at my disposal? By and large I did; but the criticisms I would have had of my force were the same that all commanders have in any multinational, coalition, NATO, or UN operations and that is that there are national caveats, constraints and restrictions which individual states place on the use of their troops, on their rules of engagement or on their employment. In my opinion this is the most serious defect in the concept of interoperability and that is the political lack of interoperability, and this can be a frustration to the commander who wants freedom to deploy, manoeuvre or concentrate his forces to a common purpose and use them all in the same way in order to achieve the mission of the force. Nevertheless, by way of comparison, even though NATO has been in existence for over 50 years it still faces similar interoperability issues and, although it is constantly improving, it is always difficult when commanders face the challenge of interoperability obstacles by virtue of political constraint on the utility of forces. This is most serious if and when you really having to mix it if you need to in peacekeeping operations.

But if we had had to mix it, whether it is in crowd and riot control or something more serious than that, I am pretty confident that we had a good command and good

leadership and I would have had confidence in them to succeed in such roles. As it turned out, the chances of them having to fight, or do crowd and riot control, were fairly limited because the situation was benign. Therefore our main role involved providing reassurance. Did we do that well? Yes, we are very good at doing what I would describe as flag waving patrols; but it's significantly more than that or simply winning the hearts and minds. It's everything from community relations, information operations, building bakeries, doing

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community relations projects, but above all a credible presence that will bring people along. At the same time you have to demonstrate that you can be and will be hard nosed if necessary and putting that message across is something which the commanders and soldiers have to get right when they interface with the public. I think that EUFOR did that very well.

As well as all these varied roles that I have mentioned there is also the role of

### **Military CV of Gen Leakey.**

Lieutenant General David Leakey was born in 1952. He was commissioned into the Royal Tank Regiment in 1971, and has served in UK, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Germany, the Balkans and in Canada.

He was Colonel Military Operations 3 in the MOD with responsibility for Operations Planning and Policy covering Eastern and Western Europe, and specifically the Former Yugoslavia. During this appointment in 1995 he attended the Higher Command and Staff Course at Camberley and, later that year, was the UK Military Representative in Dayton at the Bosnia peace negotiations. Whilst commanding 20 Armoured Brigade based in Germany in 1996/97, he deployed as part of the NATO (IFOR and SFOR) operation in Bosnia. He was Director of Military Operations in the Ministry of Defence 1997-1999 and subsequently attended the Royal College of Defence Studies before assuming the post of Chief of Staff Northern Ireland in 2001. He left Northern Ireland on promotion to Major General to take up the appointment of Director General Army Training and Recruiting from 2002 to 2004. He commanded the European Force (EUFOR) responsible for peace and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004/05. He was appointed Director General of the European Union Military Staff in Brussels on promotion to Lieutenant General from 28 February 2007. He has a keen interest in classical music and is a (very) amateur pianist and singer. He remains an enthusiastic and vigorous all round games player having played squash at Army and national level and numerous other sports at lower representative levels. He enjoys tennis, shooting, golf, skiing, board sailing, and chain sawing. He is Colonel Commandant of the Royal Tank Regiment, President of Army Squash, a Governor of the National Children's Orchestra of Great Britain, Honorary Colonel of Army Cadet Force Music, Patron of the Dorset Yeomanry, and Chairman of a small property management company. He is married and has two sons.

supporting the civil actors in the operation, such as the police, high representatives, economic programmes, as well as legal, justice and rule of law programmes. Because in instable situations - and Bosnia is but one example - organised crime, corruption, terrorism, rule of law disobedience, et cetera, is alive and well. This is the case in nearly all conflict

and post-conflict countries, such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and others. The European Commission puts military and police programmes in, as do the OSCE and the UN, bilateral programmes to sort out the system failings which undermine good governance both at the political level and the administrative level of the country. Without good governance people will not have the confidence to invest in a country or be able to trust the rule of law; simple issues such as the ability of a court to enforce a contract, or a bank to look after your money responsibly; without these an economy will not prosper and the politics will not thrive.

The next problem is how best to use a force in a benign environment where it is not fighting or patrolling aggressively. This is where you get into new and difficult territory particularly where you are supporting the fight against organised crime and corruption: we must participate in these roles because these are the causes of new instability in an emerging state.

We never now let wars go to their completion; we stop them so that there is no fighting and usually we get enough peace to progress - but you are left with all the consequent management of the war which incorporates rebuilding or reinforcing the supports for society as required. We are very good at this: look at these fantastic missions that the EU is running in the rule of law, police training, justice, core performance and so on. European Commission's projects of institution building are growing and there is more cooperation and coherence with the military. What is the best use of the Force in these situations?

Well the military have lots of competence which they can use; whether it is surveillance intelligence or just an armed military presence to deter crime or to put pressure on organised crime gangs. In Bosnia we did it with the illegal timber industry where there was massive fraud; while we did not know all the details of how the illegality was being conducted, we knew enough about it to use our forces to put pressure not just on the crime gangs who were doing it but on the politicians who were running it; it was quickly apparent to them that EUFOR was putting the squeeze on them.

Should we use soldiers like that if we want to retain their warrior fighting image and ethos and credibility? It's not really how we should be using soldiers, but we now need



*Lt Gen Leakey with Javier Solana, EU Foreign & Security Policy Representative.*

**EUMS Information**

The EUMS is a General Directorate within the Council General Secretariat and is the only permanent integrated military structure of the European Union. The EUMS was established on a provisional basis in April 2000 and effectively by Council decision of January 2001.

The EU Military Staff works under the "military direction" of the EU Military Committee, which represents the Chiefs of Defence of all the Member States. It provides in-house military expertise for the Secretary-General / High Representative (SG/HR). The main operational functions of the EUMS include early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning.

to think about what causes instability and how you ameliorate the situation and what tools governments are prepared to deploy. So one now needs a military people who are adaptive, who have the skills and ability to do anything from policing and customs operations at one end to winning a fight at the other end.

**When you compare so-called traditional static peacekeeping to the challenges future crisis management operations may present, will the military need to possess more skills in order to successfully accomplish such roles?**

Yes; in combination with a realisation by the civilian actors that it may be that we need to put more effort into the civilian intervention in these countries. There are vast sums of money being invested by the EU into institution building, into intellectual resources, human resource and finance in Africa, the Middle East and many other

places; these are the unsung programmes that the EU is doing out there and these programme are contributing to stability, development, growth and prosperity in these regions in a significant way. However, the military are usually the visible side of a European Union effort in the realm of its peacekeeping world, but the civilian intervention is equally important but for different reasons; they certainly are more expensive but these are specialists you need fighting organised crime, corruption, banking and industrial crime, tax evasion, and so on. The experts who do this are in short supply and the military cannot fulfil all of those roles; but what the military can do is to adapt to each circumstance in order to have some effect where they don't necessarily have the expertise.

**The Brahimi reforms of United Nations operations sought, inter alia, increased support from regional actors; this reform coincided with**



**the development of the ESDP, which signalled its intention to assist in burden sharing with the United Nations, most especially in crisis management. Is it conceivable that the United Nations could become over reliant on EU capacities?**

No, I don't believe that it will. The EU has responded in the past to a request from the UN, notably with regard to EUFOR DR Congo and the earlier Operation ARTEMIS, also in the DR Congo; but each and any such request will be dealt with individually and on its merits. This involvement could conceivably entail the use of Battlegroups, but need not necessarily do so; any response would be specifically tailored to the UN request. For example, in 2006 the UN retained control of and enhanced its own UNIFIL operation, although the EUMS assisted informally in coordinating offers of support from Member States.

**When Member States commit troops to an EU Force (EUFOR) the 'costs lie where they fall' principle applies and this appears unlikely to change fundamentally. Where Member States commit troops directly to the United Nations certain costs are recouped from the UN. Could this issue of costs result in certain Member States opting to provide troops to the UN as a cheaper option to providing troops to the EU, or, because costs lie where they fall, not to participate at all in certain requests?**

I am sure that this is a consideration for individual Member States and, as such, is a matter for them. But I don't think that cost is the sole factor in determining whether a Member State decides to support an operation, or not.

**While the EU and NATO have much in common, is there any concern that both may become competitors in the crisis management market? How do EU member states, who are also NATO members, decide to which organisation to commit its assets in situations where both are providing military forces?**

You are correct in saying that the EU and NATO have much in common. They are similar in that they have the same values, are groupings of western democracies, and

share similar strategic interests. They differ in that while NATO is mainly a military force, operates in a collective defence capacity and across the spectrum of military capabilities, the EU, on the other hand, is mainly political, civilian and economic in its use of instruments and deals mainly with the crisis management tasks mentioned in article 17.2 of the Constitutional Treaty and elaborated on in the EU's Security Strategy. These include such tasks as humanitarian & rescue operations, Peacekeeping, combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and extend to institution building, including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, security sector reform, and support for third countries in combating terrorism.

From the EU Special Representative down, the EU adopts a coherent approach to all of its efforts within a theatre. Real cooperation exists, for example in the meetings that take place regularly between NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC); both Military Committees; and through the so-called "Berlin plus" arrangements, whereby the EU may utilise NATO assets, including, as in the case of Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia, command and control assets such as the Operation Headquarters in SHAPE in Belgium. Regular staff discussions take place and we have developed our liaison arrangements to the extent that there is now an EU liaison cell at SHAPE and a NATO

permanent liaison team in the EUMS building in Brussels.

To answer your question directly then, EU Member States who are also NATO members, coordinate their contributions to each organisation so as to avoid overlap. So, for example, those German soldiers who are part of the German-Dutch-Finnish battlegroup currently on standby to the EU may well find themselves on standby to NATO in the future.

**What are the political and decision making processes at EU level in the lead-up to a Battlegroup being committed?**

To simplify it as much as possible; once the Council has decided that an operation may take place, then the Secretary-General/ High Representative will send a fact-finding mission consisting, normally, of military and civilian experts, the members of which will contribute to a comprehensive approach to the crisis with proposals regarding various level of engagement. The EU Military Committee (EUMC) will then consider these before forwarding them to the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Of course, these are also considered by military and civilian members of headquarters and ministries of defence and foreign affairs of the relevant Member State. Once the PSC recommends a selected option, a crisis management concept is agreed by the Council. Then the EUMS develops and prioritises a military strategic option which is also passed



through the EUMC and the PSC before the Council agrees it. Finally, the EUMS prepares an initiating military directive which, having been passed through the EUMC and approved by the PSC, authorises the operation commander to prepare his concept of operations and his operation plan.

**While it will be the Council who will take any and all political decisions to commit forces, are decisions on the size, composition and strategy of the military forces solely the prerogative of the military planners?**

The EUMS provides military advice to the Council through the EU Military Committee and the Political and Security Committee. This military advice is scrutinised not only in the EUMC and the PSC, but also in the Member States, from both a political and a military point of view. The resulting Council decision will encompass all of these inputs. Of course, the strategy for the use of military force includes both political and military considerations; but the size and composition of such a force are mainly military considerations which may well be decided by the operation commander.

Over time, potential obstacles to efficient and harmonious BG operations (such as language differences, differences in military doctrine and practices, lack of commonality of military equipment, security of communications) will be ironed out; differences such as these can yield either positive or negative results.

**It is likely that crisis management activities of a Battlegroup will be conducted under a UN Security Council resolution. Certain member states, such as Ireland, have constitutional and legislative requirements that must be fulfilled prior to committing its assets in such circumstances; this process could result in a delay in committing assets or indeed in a refusal to commit. Bearing in mind that each Battlegroup will be tailored to meet the challenges of the mission, how could such domestic political obligations affect the EUMS in its decision making?**

This is a political question and not really a matter for the EUMS. In the overall, a UN Security Council resolution is not legally required but, in the light of the primary role of the UNSC for the maintenance of international peace and security, it is deemed politically appropriate at present. I realise that some Member States may have more stringent requirements; nevertheless, the Member States who are contributing to the Battlegroups assure the EU that their commitments will be met during their stand-by period.

The proliferation of NGOs in most of the world's trouble-spots means that, in missions concerned with nation building, evacuation or humanitarian assistance, the EU must coordinate with these agencies. While formal EU-UN, EU-NATO and EU-AU structures exist, is it a function of the recently established Civil-Military Cell within the EUMS to liaise and set up systems for interaction with such NGOs, and is it envisaged that this Cell will fulfil other functions?

The EU's coherent approach to crisis management aims to ensure civil-military coordination under the overall guidance of a EUSR. The Civil-Military Cell of the EUMS operates at the strategic planning level and actual "on the ground" coordination within the operational theatre is done at the behest of the EUSR.

But I would like to take the opportunity to mention the Civ-Mil Cell. The Civ/Mil Cell, including its inherent Operations Centre capacity,

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is the first standing EU institution, including from the European Commission that fully integrates military and civilian expertise. It has been placed within the EU Military Staff and, consisting of some 30 people, constitutes one of its six divisions at the EUMS. In conformity with its mandate agreed by the Council in December 2004, the Civ-Mil Cell was established in the second semester of 2005 and has been operational for over one year now. It consists of two distinct branches: The Operations Centre Permanent Staff and a Strategic Planning Branch; this is a unique configuration.

For the first time, the Civ-Mil Cell has brought together officers, diplomats, civilian experts and Council and Commission Officials in a single integrated setting. This has worked successfully and those who initially might have feared a 'clash of cultures' were proven wrong. We are rather proud to lead such a team of dedicated and highly qualified staff that brings together a particularly broad range of know-how.

This shows that civil-military cooperation works and proves that combining the professional experience from such diverse backgrounds in an integrated structure can actually deliver added value.

A function of the Civ-Mil cell is to adopt a more holistic approach to crisis management operations; to analyse and create the conditions in a conflict whereby all those 'civilian' pillars such as justice, the rule of law, policing, at cetera are comprehended. Has the EU, by virtue of its composition and institutions, adopted a more comprehensive approach to these issues than other agencies?

The military who are running and staffing NATO are, in the main, the same military who are in the EU: we all share the same ideas; we have all been in NATO or EU or both; we all go to the same military staff colleges; we all generally follow the same doctrine. Take Afghanistan, for example, where NATO is operating. NATO have not gone there just to do a military operation: the commanders and staff in the NATO HQ in Afghanistan regularly conduct complicated international multi-agency meetings in Kabul and elsewhere in the provinces, pulling together the comprehensive approach as you describe it.

The EU has a slight advantage in that we have many of those tools in-house if you like and therefore we are now trying to develop



*Lt Col John Durnin, Lt Col John Tolan, Lt Col Mick Beary, Sgt Maj Derek Lambe, Lt Gen David Leakey, Brig Gen Michael Finn, Col William O' Hara and Comdt Michael Geraghty of RACO.*

in our own Headquarters in the EUMS in Brussels, as opposed to locally out in the operational theatres, an integrated approach to military and civilian operations, planning and conduct, and arising from this the EU has a more joined up policy between their military and their civilian elements. The EU can bring some civilian instruments which have some military expertise, support and understanding integrated into their planning with the intention of making these missions more effective. But none the less, even if you have an ESDP mission with a mixture of military and civilian elements, as in the case of Bosnia, that is not enough to encompass a comprehensive approach. A comprehensive approach has to include the other international actors: one of whom, of course, is the host country because local ownership is the absolute principal in the comprehensive approach. You have to get the local populations on board and being part of the solution. Very often, the locals are not members of the European Union: they don't have people in Brussels at the planning level so we have to do that out in the theatre. Added to this, we don't have representatives of the World Bank, the IMF, the UN, the UNHCR also, or the other international actors sitting in the Kortenbergh building in Brussels (the HQ of the EUMS); they are all part of the international community and, in general, are all present in these



**Lieutenant Colonel John Hamill**

European Union Cell at NATO SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe]

With the signing of the "NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP" on 16th December 2002, a basis was established between the EU and NATO to cooperate in the areas of

crisis management, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the development of plans to assure the EU access to NATO's assets for its own military operations.

Lieutenant Colonel John Hamill, a former President of RACO, is part of the European Union Military Staff, but unlike most in the EUMS he is based at the NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe [SHAPE] near Mons in Belgium. His primary role is that of Strategic Planner for the EU operation commander for future 'Berlin Plus' operations; these are operations by EU Forces which utilise NATO assets. Examples include: the first EU military mission, operation CONCORDIA in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM) from 31st March 2003, and which was completed in six months; and the EUFOR-ALTHEA operation launched on December 2nd 2004 and which took over from the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both of which has Irish DF personnel involved.

A secondary role of the Cell is to provide liaison between the European Union, primarily the EUMS, and SHAPE. Within the Cell I am largely responsible for the operations area which entails daily interaction with SHAPE and EUMS executive office in Brussels on a variety of operational matters such as military policy and plans, operational intelligence and the civilian-military functions. Our current tasking includes work on the forthcoming ESDP missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

operational theatres. So when we talk about the comprehensive approach this is not something that ESDP can do on its own in a theatre of instability; there are always the other international actors that must be considered. I think where the EU has an advantage over NATO is that we can come with, at least, quite a lot of civilian and military considerations and resources already joined up in the same policy and working coherently together at the outset of planning rather than having to pull it together maybe with inconsistent mandates in the theatre.

**Is it possible that the EU, mainly due to its composition, institutions and structures, has more long-term potential as an agent of the UN than say NATO ?**

I do not think there is an easy answer to that question; for example one of the reasons why the EU set up ESDP and decided to have a military capability was that there are some places where NATO does not have any interests or the US does not have any interests or perhaps are not welcome for one reason or another and therefore we have another tool here. Look at the international tool box of both military and civilian actors; you have got the OSCE, the UN, the EU, coalitions, single nations and so on, and in certain global trouble-spots, particularly if you are going to do peacekeeping, you have to work out what is going to be consented to by the country, state or region in which you are deploying and so the international community needs to use the right tool.

I guess there are some places where the EU might not be so appropriate; so it is not that one is better than the other or more useful than the other – each is different and has different





**Lieutenant Colonel John Tolan**

Action Officer; Policy and Plans Division of the EUMS. John Tolan, a former member of

RACO's National Executive, works on the staff of Policy & Plans Division where the task is to develop concepts for employing military forces in ESDP. Critical to this work is envisioning and conceptualising applications for military forces in response to today's complex challenges. EU peace support operations and humanitarian concepts employ a comprehensive approach that tailors the response to the specific crisis by addressing the current situation and deeper underlying problems. The work also includes providing military strategic advice in a political-military environment, external liaison, and communicating doctrine and concepts to Member States. In 2006, Lieutenant Colonel Tolan held the portfolios on the Long Term Vision project and now coordinates the EUMS response to the Capability Development Plan that emerged from the LTV.

**“We are now trying to develop in our own Headquarters in the EUMS in Brussels, as opposed to locally out in the operational theatres, an integrated approach to military and civilian operations, planning and conduct, and arising from this the EU has a more joined up policy between their military and their civilian elements”**

advantages and attributes. When I commanded EUFOR in Bosnia I was asked if this operation was a test vehicle for a European Army; my response was that I have been in the army so long I just don't recognise the question, because almost every single operation I have participated in has been under a different umbrella organisation, either UK national, a coalition, with the OSCE, UN or NATO and every time the model in question has suited the political

and geographical circumstances. So we should not say that one organisation is better or more suited than another; the world is not as clear cut as that in terms of the requirements or indeed the organisation that can deliver those requirements.

