RACO SUBMISSION ON TERMS OF REFERENCE AND COMPOSITION
Executive Summary
The Defence Forces currently operate in a state of near crisis and with great uncertainty about their ability to carry out their assigned roles going forward. The proposed Commission on the Defence Forces is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to address the issues that have brought us to this point. RACO welcomes the Commission but strongly recommends that it be expanded in scope to review the Defence Organisation as a whole. The Commission must be guided by a strategic review of current and future threats and risks to the State. It must define the roles of Defence in addressing these threats and grasp this opportunity to design an organisation that sets that standard of an agile, robust, capable force at home and overseas, fully resourced to deliver all necessary roles.
The exercise will be meaningless unless a genuine will exists to put in place the resources that this force would require. Adequate budgets must be put in the right hands at the right times to facilitate administration and operations. Important and urgent work is underway with the HLIP and will soon commence with the Defence Forces Pay Review Body.
The Commission must not be allowed to postpone, cancel, or otherwise undermine these processes, but must be its own undertaking with a medium- to long-term view. It must be open and transparent and have access to the knowledge and expertise required to deliver necessary change and must have an independent chair and a multi-disciplinary Board. RACO looks forward to the release of the TORs and continued engagement with the process.
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Summary of Recommendations:
- Conduct the process as a holistic review of Defence and the Defence Organisation.
- Identify the current and future risks and threats, nationally and internationally, that Ireland faces and define the roles of Defence in countering them.
- Identify the organisational structure and resources needed to undertake these roles effectively, being mindful always of the operational, technical, and cultural benefits of a conventional military approach.
- Embrace the WTD as an opportunity to facilitate better working practices and improve the morale and job satisfaction of personnel.
- Propose a budget that meets the requirements of the newly defined organisation and allows it to fulfil its assigned roles.
- Devolve a portion of that budget to the Chief of Staff so that senior military leadership can make operational decisions in a timely and efficient manner.
- Understand that an under-resourced force will be an ineffective force that will no longer attract or retain the best people.
- Recognise the potential that exists in our first- and second-line reserves and recommend the necessary legislative, administrative and structural frameworks to employ those capabilities.
- Support the ongoing work of the High-Level Implementation Plan and the establishment of the Defence Forces Pay Review Body.
- Establish a Board that has the correct blend of knowledge, expertise, and experience to complete its work in an impartial, open and constructive manner.
- Set firm and achievable timelines for the delivery of recommendations and propose realistic timelines for their implementation.
- Commit adequate resources and oversight to ensure full implementation of recommendations.
1. Introduction
RACO welcomes the establishment, in the Programme for Government 2020, of an independent commission to make an extensive review of defence requirements in the medium to long term. As the statutory body representing DF leaders and decision makers, a key stakeholder in the review process, and a key enabler to delivering its outcomes, RACO submits its observations on the terms of reference and composition of the review group.
The proposed Commission on Defence represents a once-in-a-generation opportunity for Ireland to make significant, positive changes in the way we, as a nation, approach Defence that will better prepare us to face our uncertain future. This review is due to examine, among other things, our ‘arrangements for the effective defence of the country at land, air and sea’, and our ‘Structures for governance, joint command, and control structures’.1 While the last holistic review of Defence was conducted in the early 1990’s, numerous reviews of the Defence Forces themselves have been conducted in the intervening decades. If there is a serious intent to address the strategic factors listed in the PfG, then a strategic mindset and approach is required. An attempt to examine the factors only from the perspective of the Defence Forces, will fall well short of that requirement.
Recommendation: Conduct the process as a holistic review of Defence and the Defence Organisation.
2. Scope
Norway’s Defence Plan 2020 states in its introduction that ‘Norway is currently better suited to address emerging threats and challenges, due to decisions made in the previous Long Term Plan’.2 It also asserts that increasing threats, challenges and vulnerabilities must be met by active policies, priorities and measures. Investment in defence and security should be a key priority for the Irish Government.
The White Paper Update 2019 makes a commitment to undertake defence reviews on a fixed cycle and that the next iteration would be a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Defence Review’.3 Similar in scope to the Commission on the Future of Policing in Ireland, this Commission should be expanded to cover Defence as a concept in the Irish context, and to analyse the current structures and capabilities of the Defence Organisation as a whole. As part of this process, a detailed examination of the roles and responsibilities of various elements of the Defence Organisation and the interaction between them is essential.
The Commission must be given the latitude to examine the current, and prospective future, roles of the Defence Forces. The White Paper on Defence 2015, White Paper Update 2019 and National Risk Assessment 2019 provide Ireland’s strategic context and goals in national security and defence, and international peace and security. The proposed National Security Strategy (NSS) will play a key role in this process in the future also. Public consultation on the NSS concluded in December 2019 and the current work of that process must be reflected in the future work of the Commission to align these processes and define our defence goals. The ways in which the Defence Organisation can contribute to these goals, and the means available to it to achieve them now and in the future, must be subject of honest, independent review. The national approach to air search and rescue (SAR) is a good example.
State outsourcing of SAR function
The State currently contracts a civilian company to provide most of its SAR services and paid €367m to this company from the Transport Vote in 2018/19.1 As an essential capability, however, the Air Corps must train and organise to provide this live-saving service at a moment’s notice. Effectively, the State is relying on the Defence Forces to maintain the capability but diverting the funding for same to a civilian company. Serious consideration should be given to making the Air Corps the primary agency for this task and providing it the funding, structures, and resources to do it. The benefits from a training, capability and retention perspective are self-evident.
The current global pandemic, the uncertainty around Europe’s relationships with Britain and Russia, the evolving complexity of the peacekeeping environment, and the prevalence of severe weather events should all factor in the assessment of our roles and capabilities on land, at sea, in the air and in cyberspace.
Recommendation: Identify the current and future risks and threats, nationally and internationally, that Ireland faces and define the roles of Defence in countering them.
3. Resourcing and Organisation
The proposed Commission is an ideal opportunity to address the implementation of the Working Time Directive (WTD) to the everyday running of the Defence Forces. RACO accepts that the unique nature of military service means that, in certain circumstances, the WTD cannot be applied to military operations and that suitable compensatory time off or remuneration must be provided instead. The Association is of the firm belief, however, that with a positive and open-minded approach by all parties, the WTD can be applied in the majority of cases to improve the work-life balance of personnel without having an impact on operational outputs. For this to be successful, a reimagining of the way in which our Defence Forces personnel and assets are structured and deployed is necessary.
The primary role of the Defence Forces is to defend the state against armed aggression. While this role is characterised as contingent, it must be underwritten by the continuous maintenance of a credible deterrence and intent to protect our valuable military neutrality. To that end, a modern and capable conventional force must be at the heart of the Defence Forces. The Irish peacekeeper abroad, working in an ever more complex peace and security environment, is renowned for their ability to wield the soft power that comes with the Irish flag they proudly wear. But this ability to de-escalate and mediate is dependent on the robust military capabilities available in the same package, capabilities acquired and fostered in the culture of military discipline, training and identity that exists at home. Recent events have shown the significant gaps that exist in that conventional capability, notably our inability to monitor our sovereign airspace, and the lack of a strategic lift capability to deploy and recover our personnel abroad.
The current strength of the Permanent Defence Force is well short of its establishment, but even if the minimum required figure of 9,500 personnel were achieved in the near term, we would still find ourselves under-resourced in terms of human capital.4 The figure of 9,500 allocates almost every soldier, sailor, and air crew to a specific appointment here at home. It does not, with the exception of small number of senior officers, account for over 500 personnel deployed overseas, or the 500 undergoing intensive pre-deployment training to replace them, or the 500 who have recently returned and are taking time to reconnect with their loved ones. 9,500 does not account for the roughly forty Captains and Commandants, essential middle management of the organisation, undergoing fulltime professional military education in the Military College. Even if we achieved 9,500 personnel tomorrow, we would instantly remove hundreds of personnel from that figure for essential training and deployments. Consideration must be given to a realistic establishment that captures overseas units and fulltime training.
Recommendation:
• Identify the organisational structure and resources needed to undertake these roles effectively, being mindful always of the operational, technical, and cultural benefits of a conventional military approach.
• Embrace the WTD as an opportunity to facilitate better working practices and improve the morale and job satisfaction of personnel.
4. Budget
The current method by which the Defence budget is set and consumed must be examined. No new or existing goal can be achieved without the financial resources to make it so. Ireland and New Zealand are often compared as island nations with similar sized populations and defence forces, but this comparison is misleading. In August of 2020, Ireland was the 36th of 119 troop contributors to UN peace support operations globally, with 483 personnel deployed. New Zealand was 100th with seven personnel deployed5. Ireland maintains this operational output with a defence budget at less than 0.3% of GDP compared to New Zealand with a budget at 1.5% of GDP6. Ireland’s budget-to-outputs ratio in international peace support operations is completely inverted to that of most reasonably comparable nations. Notwithstanding the size of the Defence budget, the way it is used should be reviewed. The Chief of Staff, senior military advisor to the Minister of Defence, has no access to an operational budget. His ability to make operational decisions is hindered by the requirement to defer to a civilian counterpart with whom the authority to release necessary funding resides. This situation not only delays and complicates the operational decision-making process but undermines the authority of the Chief of Staff as the senior military figure of the Defence Organisation. Moreover, the Chief of Staff, unlike the Garda Commissioner, must make operational decisions without the knowledge of whether or not adequate compensation will be paid to those being deployed. The devolution of an operational budget from the Department of Defence to the Defence Forces would place operational resources in the hands of the operational practitioners while allowing the experts in policy and administration more time and space to deliver in those areas.
Recommendation:
• Propose a budget that meets the requirements of the newly defined organisation and allows it to fulfil its assigned roles.
• Devolve a portion of that budget to the Chief of Staff so that senior military leadership can make operational decisions in a timely and efficient manner, considering the IR implications of these decisions.
• Understand that an under-resourced force will be an ineffective force that will no longer attract or retain the best people.
5. Reserve
Recent experience of severe weather events and the response to COVID-19 have shown the current and future potential of our Reserve Defence Forces. The Commission must be tasked to explore this potential further and to identify the legislative and operational frameworks necessary to release the true value of our part time volunteers. In particular, a review of the current First and Second Line Reserves is required. Retired Association members, professional military officers with years of experience, have reported the difficulty in joining the Reserves post-retirement. The positive impact these officers could have on the training and organisation of our Reserves cannot be overstated and they should be facilitated in every way possible to continue adding value after they leave the Permanent Defence Force.
A dedicated cadre of PDF staff to drive the command, training and administration of the Reserve Forces was once a standard feature in most installations. As the need to better integrate the standards and capabilities of the Reserve and Permanent elements is clear, reinstatement of the Cadre would be a strong first step. This would also re-establish the local links between permanent and reserve personnel, which have historically proven so successful as an aid to recruitment, particularly in rural areas, but even more importantly, as a form of informal vetting for prospective inductees, thereby enhancing security.
The use of technical expertise currently residing in the Reserve, particularly in Medical, Engineering, IT and Cyber, for operations at home and overseas should be paid particular attention. These skills are difficult and expensive to acquire and the maintenance of a surge capacity may be beyond the resources of the Permanent Defence Force. With the correct legislation, regulation, training and incentives in place, reservists from these industries could prove hugely valuable in the future.
Recommendation:
• Recognise the potential that exists in our first- and second-line reserves and recommend the necessary legislative, administrative and structural frameworks to employ those capabilities.
• Rediscover the value of the Reserve as an aid to recruitment, and an amplifier of security.
6. Government HLIP ‘Strengthening our Defence Forces’
We are currently in Phase One of the High-Level Implementation Plan (HLIP) to deliver the outcomes identified by the Third Report of the Public Service Pay Commission. This plan contains a comprehensive list of projects aimed at attracting, valuing and retaining members of the Permanent Defence Force and establishing it as an employer of choice to attract new talent. RACO supports this process and notes that while the majority of projects remain incomplete, the work of the PSPC and its conclusions remain valid. The HLIP is aimed at addressing concerns of an immediate nature and every effort should be made to support the Programme Management Office in delivering the remining projects. The proposed Commission should not be a pretext to suspend or dismiss the HLIP. This holds true for Phase Two of the Plan also, the establishment of a Defence Forces Pay Review Body. This pay review body will be tasked to address well-established issues in the remuneration of Defence Forces personnel in the context of the unique nature of military service, issues which are hugely influential to the current Retention Crisis. The proposed Commission should not be an impediment or delay to the establishment and operation of the Pay Review Body.
Recommendation: Support the ongoing work of the High-Level Implementation Plan and the establishment of the Defence Forces Pay Review Body.
7. Composition
To be effective and achieve buy-in from the many stakeholders to the process, not least the citizens of Ireland, the Commission must be open, transparent, and inclusive. At the outset, the Commission must have an independent chair with extensive knowledge and experience of national and international affairs. This chair must be supported by academics and professionals from the disciplines of cyber security, international security and defence, human resources, and industrial relations. The unique nature of military service cannot be meaningfully conveyed through documentation and statistics alone, and the Commission must have military representation to add the necessary context. Retired senior Defence Forces officers from the Army, Air Corps and Naval Service should be included. A retired senior officer from a foreign defence organisation, one who has knowledge and experience of UN peace support operations and preferably has worked with Irish troops in the past, will add balance and objectivity to the process also. The Terms of Reference must make clear timelines for the establishment of the Board, its deliberations, and its recommendations. The Board should propose achievable timelines for the implementation of its recommendations. Adequate resources must be committed, and credible oversight established to ensure the full implementation of recommendations.
Recommendation
• Establish a Board that has the correct blend of knowledge, expertise, and experience to complete its work in an impartial, open, and constructive manner.
• Set firm and achievable timelines for the delivery of recommendations and propose realistic timelines for their implementation.
• Commit adequate resources and oversight to ensure full implementation of recommendations.
8. Conclusion
Reports on the Challenge of a Workplace, reports by Independent Monitoring Groups, reports by Price Waterhouse, and high-level plans from the Public Service Pay Commission have all looked at the Defence Forces through a narrow lens and have produced narrow results. We need to ask ourselves ‘What’s the Why?’ in terms of the Defence Organisation. What does the State want us to do, and what resources are required to execute the mission? What are the optimum governance structures for the security and defence of Ireland?
RACO warmly welcomes the establishment of a Commission but hopes the opportunity to conduct a strategic review of Defence as a concept, and of the Defence Organisation as the means to achieve it, will not be lost. Current initiatives to address the ongoing Retention Crisis should not be impinged by the Commission and should be allowed to conclude their important work. RACO looks forward to the publication of the Terms of Reference and to engaging further with all stakeholders to this worthwhile and necessary undertaking.
1 Programme for Government - Our Shared Future. pp. 115.
2 The Defence of Norway, Capability and Readiness, Long Term Defence Plan 2020. pp. 2
3 White Paper on Defence Update 2019. pp. 1, 9, 49.
4 On 01 September 2020 the DF strength was 8,374 or 88%.
5 peacekeeping.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors
6 Data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPNG.GD.ZS